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Abstract
We reformulate the classic CSV model of ﬁnancial contracting from Townsend
(1979) and Gale & Hellwig (1985) to tackle criticisms raised against it voiced by Hart
(1995), such as lack of optimal behavior at the repayment stage and an inability
to allow for outside equity. As a result, we obtain a theory of capital structure
that accommodates empirical regularities such as bankruptcies, strategic defaults of
debt obligations, and violations of absolute priority rules as parts of the equilibrium
description.
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1 Introduction
Financial contracts typically do not specify repayments to investors as a detailed function
of all payoﬀ relevant variables. For example, debt contracts normally do not specify
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1repayments as a detailed function of the ﬁnancial state of the ﬁrm, but rather puts some
easily describable liability on the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow through a ﬁxed repayment obligation.
One focal approach in the literature that attempts to model this feature of ﬁnancial
contracts is the Costly State Veriﬁcation (CSV) approach. The core of this approach is
that, upon the date of repayment, inside investors have superior information to the outside
investors about the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm, and therefore may try to divert cash from
outside investors by underreporting the true cash-ﬂo w .O fc o u r s e ,t h i sm a yi nt u r nc r e a t e
an ex-ante governance problem in that external investors may be reluctant to ﬁnance the
ﬁrm. The weapon outside investors can use to mitigate the cash diversion problem is
to partially or fully verify the true proﬁtability of the ﬁrm, by e.g. demanding an audit,
declaring bankruptcy, or even discharge management and take control of the operations of
the ﬁrm. Such a leveling of information can only take place at a certain cost of veriﬁcation.
Celebrated papers by Townsend (1979) and Gale & Hellwig (1985) derive debt contracts
as optimal under such circumstances, i.e., contracts which promises a ﬁxed repayment,
and where the creditor veriﬁes whenever the oﬀered repayment falls below the promised
repayment.
In spite of its elegance, the classroom CSV model suﬀers from some shortcomings.
First, as pointed out by Hart (1995) and others, the debt contract derived under CSV
relies on a commitment on the part of the lender to verify whenever the debt is not repaid
in full, even if accepting a concession would be better for the lender, since veriﬁcation is
costly. As such, the equilibrium supporting the "optimal contract" may involve non-Nash
strategies to be played by the creditor in default states, and — perhaps equally importantly
— implies that the model cannot accommodate strategic defaults of debt obligations by
the borrower. Second, as also pointed out by Hart (1995), while in practice debt typically
coexists with equity as a ﬁnancial claim on the ﬁrm, the standard CSV model is unable
to explain the use of outside equity, and hence unable to account for capital structures
with both debt and outside equity on the balance sheet.1
The motivation of the present paper is to recast the CSV model in response to these
1Indeed, as noted by Townsend (1979), ”the [CSV] model as it stands may contribute to our un-
derstanding of closely held ﬁrms, but cannot explain the coexistence of publicly held shares and debt.”
2criticisms. For debt contracts, we require sequential rationality and allow for stochastic
veriﬁcation at the repayment stage. In other words, veriﬁcation occurs only if it is an
optimal strategy given the repayment oﬀer by the borrower, and the veriﬁcation strategy
may be stochastic. This allows us to solve for an equilibrium where the manager oﬀers
the lender a debt repayment that depends on the true cash-ﬂow of the ﬁrm, and the
lender monitors with a probability that is increasing in the magnitude of the default.
This lenience on part of the lender implies that there can be strategic defaults of debt
repayments in equilibrium, in that the borrower defaults on his debt obligation even
though he has suﬃc i e n tc a s ho nh a n dt oa v o i dad e f a u l t .
We also introduce outside equity in the CSV setting. While debt involves a ﬁxed
payment being promised to the outside investor, equity is issued with a promise to the
investor of a ﬁxed fraction of ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. This fractional cash ﬂow right is in turn
supported by an unconditional right for the investor to intervene and verify. We solve for
an equilibrium where the payout proposed to the investor by the entrepreneur is increasing
in the true cash ﬂow, and the investor intervenes with a probability that is decreasing in
the size of the proposed payout.
Combining debt and equity in the model (where debt is the senior claimant) allows us
to consider the choice of the optimal capital structure. We show that while the ﬁrm will
never be funded by 100% equity (it will always want to issue at least some risky debt),
it may be optimal for the ﬁrm to raise all its external funds in the form of debt. Less
surprisingly, it will issue a mix of outside equity and debt when the intervention cost of
equity is suﬃciently low compared to that of debt. Moreover, we show that equilibria
with a mixed capital structure involves a division of labor: creditors monitor the manager
in bad states and outside equity monitors the manager in high states.
A ﬁnancing mix can be optimal even if it implies that violations of absolute priority
rules can occur in equilibrium, in that outside equity receives a positive repayment even
if creditors are not repaid in full. It may be noted here that the literature generating
AP-violations (e.g., Bebchuk, 2002) deals with AP-violations vis a vis the inside owner-
entrepreneur. In our setting, there are AP-violations in the sense that both inside and
outside equity receive positive payments even though debt is not paid in full.
The main message we obtain from the paper is that there exists a convenient way
3to escape the commitment assumption associated with the standard CSV model. In
the equilibria we derive, investors make an optimal veriﬁcation choice conditional on their
(reasonable) beliefs about the true cash ﬂow, and the entrepreneur makes repayment oﬀers
that depend on the true cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm. With this starting point, we obtain plausible
results on the possibility and properties of a mixed capital structure, encompassing such
features as strategic defaults and priority violations.
We should emphasize at this point that our primary purpose with the paper is to
understand the choice of capital structure, and the implications of a mixture. To do this
we work with a limited contract space, consisting of standard debt and equity contracts.
Our approach should here be contrasted with the mechanism design approach of several
other papers in the CSV literature, such as Krasa & Villamil (2000) and Krasa et al.
(2003), that derive optimal contracts under modiﬁed circumstances to those considered
by Townsend (1979). We see pros and cons with both our more institutional approach
and the more normative approach, and cannot see that there are compelling arguments
to discard any of these approaches given the current state of knowledge.2 However, since
debt and equity contracts in real life can be of a somewhat richer variety than captured
by our model, we have taken care to check our results for robustness against alternative
formulations. All our attempts in this direction indicate that the basic results of the paper
h o l dt h r o u g hw i t hs u c hm o d i ﬁed contracts.
The CSV literature has taken alternative routes to solve the dilemma posed by the lack
of sequential rationality of the basic CSV contracts. For example, Gale & Hellwig (1989)
impose sequential rationality in a signaling game where the cash ﬂow is fully revealed
through the repayment oﬀer from the inside investor to the outside investor. However, in
Gale & Hellwig (1989) contracting plays no explicit role. In contrast, we allow for (debt
or equity) contracts to be written on payoﬀsi nt h ev e r i ﬁcation state, which enables us to
endogenously determine the equilibrium contracts and repayment behavior.3
2The mechanism design approach has the advantage of endogenously determining contractual forms.
However, such an approach also typically violate some important institutional rules; for example, there
are legal limitations to which contracts can count as debt (to give a tax break), and legal rules that are
designed to protect minority investors. Such rules are hard to model very precisely in a mathematical
fashion but still clearly calls for a limitation of the available contracts.
3Reinganum & Wilde (1986) consider a tax-evasion game where a tax payer submits an income state-
ment to the IRS, and the IRS makes a sequentially rational, random audit. The main diﬀerence to our
4Others who consider outside equity and debt ﬁnancing under incomplete contracting
includes Fluck (1998), Fan & Sundaresan (2000), Myers (2000), and Anderson & Nyborg
(2001), who operate in a symmetric-unveriﬁable information setup à la Grossman & Hart
(1986) and Hart & Moore (1989). However, these papers focus on dynamic issues of
repayment and do not derive an optimal mix of debt and outside equity.4 T h e r ei sa
literature on strategic defaults and AP-violations that will be discussed in Section 4.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic model is presented.
In Section 3 pure debt and pure equity ﬁnancing is considered. In Section 4 we examine
a mix of debt and equity, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The basic setup
T h ee n t r e p r e n e u ro p e r a t e si nac o m p e t i t i v em a r k e tf o rﬁnancing, and has a choice between
debt ﬁnancing and equity ﬁnancing. There are two stages, the investment stage and the
payoﬀ stage. Let the cash ﬂow x in the payoﬀ stage be a stochastic variable with density
function f(x), x ∈ [xL,x H],w h e r e0 <x L <x H. The expected cash ﬂow
R xH
xL xf(x)dx
is denoted by Ex, and the required investment amount is given by I. The entrepreneur
has zero funds. The NPV of the project (gross of veriﬁcation costs) is therefore Ex− I.
The riskless interest rate is zero, and all agents are assumed to be risk neutral. Contracts
can only specify payouts to the investors in the veriﬁcation state. A (pure) debt contract
speciﬁes the payout to the creditor as min[D,x],w h e r eD is the contractible variable.
A (pure) equity contract speciﬁes the payout to the outside equity holder as βx,w h e r e
setting is that the "contract" between a tax-payer and the IRS (proportional taxation with a penalty
for misreporting) is exogenously imposed by a third party (the "policy makers") rather than being de-
termined by competitive forces. Povel and Raith (2002) consider a related setting involving a loss in
future private beneﬁts to manager from being acquitted. As with Gale & Hellwig (1989) and Reinganum
& Wilde (1986), their setting is diﬀerent because the veriﬁcation state payoﬀs are not contracted upon.
Persons (1997) imposes sequential rationality and stochastic monitoring in a CSV setting but restricts
attention to the two-state case. Krasa & Villamil (2000) derive optimal contracts in a setting under
sequential rationality in a setting with limited commitment by the investor. They focus on equilibria
without renegotiation (by ﬁxing beliefs such that oﬀers are either accepted with probability one or zero),
in contrast to our approach. The issue of equilibrium selection is discussed further in a later footnote.
4Boyd & Smith (1999) show that the optimal contract in a CSV type of setting can involve a mix of
debt and equity. However, the payoﬀ to outside equity in their paper is only supported by the observable
part of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow, and hence their paper does not explain the use of equity ﬁnancing to projects
that generate unobservable cash-ﬂows.
5β ∈ (0,1] is the contractible variable. In Section 4, we consider the case where the
entrepreneur may ﬁnance the project through a mix of debt and equity.
The realized cash ﬂow is observed freely by the entrepreneur-manager, but can be
observed by the outside investors only at a positive cost, denoted by cD for debt, and cE
for equity. One interpretation is that cD is a bankruptcy cost, and that cE is the cost
for outside equity holders of taking control of the ﬁrm.5 Less dramatically, cD and cE
could reﬂect the creditors’ and the outside equity holders’ respective cost for performing
a thorough audit. For several reasons, it is diﬃcult to put any tight restrictions on
the relative magnitude of cD and cE, one being that debt and equity holders may have
diﬀerent information about the operations of the ﬁrm.6 At this point, we therefore merely
assume that 0 <c D,c E <x L, i.e., that there is liquidity in the ﬁrm ex post to cover the
veriﬁcation cost.7 Later, we will discuss the relative magnitude of cD and cE in more
detail. Regardless of ﬁnancing, the entrepreneur is the residual claimant.
3 Polar cases: debt or equity
For clarity of exposition, we ﬁr s tc o n s i d e rp u r ed e b ta n dp u r ee q u i t yﬁnancing in this
section, and consider the possibility of a mixture between debt and equity in Section 4.
3.1 Pure debt ﬁnancing
Debt is issued with a face value D ∈ <++ along with a right on the part of the lender to
verify (intervene) if D is not paid in full. We assume that the creditor will be reimbursed
for the costs of collecting the contracted payment D,w i t hD representing the maximum
amount that the creditor can collect net of veriﬁcation costs. Thus, the creditor obtains
5We are implicitly assuming that the manager does not lose private beneﬁts from the shareholders
taking control, and that the outside option of the manager (other career options) are independent of
whether the shareholders take control or not. These assumptions simplify the analysis, but do not change
the qualitative insights. A related change of assumptions would take into account managerial moral
hazard, by modeling managerial eﬀort or risk taking as a function of the ﬁnancial structure.
6Another reason for cE being diﬀerent from cD is that since the control rights for debt and equity
diﬀer, creditors and equity holders may have diﬀerent incentives to invest in a cheap monitoring technology
ex-ante. This argument is further discussed in Section 4.
7The liquidity restriction cD,c E <x L could be made endogenous by requring the entrepeneur to
borrow more than I, in order to keep a liquidity reserve for bad states.
6an e tp a y o ﬀ min[D + cD,x] − cD =m i n [ D,x − cD] after veriﬁcation. This feature is
consistent with the bankruptcy law in most countries. At any extent our results would
be exactly the same if the creditor pays the veriﬁcation cost.
In the current setup, it is hard to imagine debt contracts with a diﬀerent structure than
that described above. One possibility would be the use of convertible debt, as in Cornelli
& Yosha (2003). Since we assume that there are no events to condition a conversion upon
other than the repayment proposal of the manager, convertibles must either be (weakly)
dominated by straight debt or by equity in the current setting, and can therefore be
abstracted from. An extension of the model where the investors learn about x before the
repayment oﬀer by the manager would make convertibles a more interesting security to
issue for the manager.
First the parties agree upon a debt obligation D (taken as given at this point). Then
t h et r u ec a s hﬂow is realized and observed privately by the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur
makes a (deterministic) repayment oﬀer ˜ D :[ xL,x H] → [0,x H],w h e r e ˜ D ≤ x due to the
zero initial funds of the entrepreneur. Notice that the entrepreneur making a repayment
oﬀer ˜ D<Dis equivalent to proposing for the creditor to make a concession D − ˜ D on
the debt claim. Given an oﬀer ˜ D<Dby the entrepreneur, the creditor either accepts or
rejects the concession proposal. If the creditor accepts, he receives ˜ D, and the manager
gets the residual x− ˜ D. If the creditor rejects, he veriﬁes and receives a payoﬀ according
to the written contract.8 A strategy for the creditor is an accept probability Q( ˜ D),w h e r e
Q(.) is a mapping from the set of possible repayments [0,x H] to a probability on [0,1].
For ˜ D ≥ D, the contract dictates that Q( ˜ D)=1 , since the creditor may only reject oﬀers
less than D.F o r˜ D<D ,t h e nQ( ˜ D) is the probability that the creditor accepts the
concession on the debt claim proposed by the manager.
We rule out pre-commitment in the veriﬁcation strategy Q(.) by considering equilibria
that involves optimal play by the investor Nash play at all paths in the game. This
8Our approach here is similar to that in Anderson & Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral & Perraudin
(1997). Potentially, there is a third action open to the creditor, namely to put a counter-oﬀer on the
table. If the costs of making counter-oﬀers are large relative to the cost for the manager to make counter-
counter-oﬀers, the solution of a Rubinstein (1982) type of bargaining game between the manager and
the creditor would give the creditor less than accepting the oﬀer ˜ D, and hence this third action would
not be relevant. Fan & Sundaresan (2000) consider a setting which allows for varying relative bargaining
strength of the inside equity holders and the creditors.
7assumption is plausible for example for bank or venture capital type of debt, where the
relation between the borrower and the lender is of close character, and where concessions
made are not necessarily observed by the market, and hence induces no loss of reputation
for the creditor. Moreover, we focus on equilibria with stochastic monitoring by the
creditor for ˜ D<D .9 Consequently, for ˜ D(x) to be part of an equilibrium, the creditor
must be indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the oﬀer, and the only candidate





x − cD for x ∈ [xL,D+ cD]
D,f o rx ∈ [D + cD,x H]
(1)
Since the function ˜ D(x) is strictly increasing for x ∈ [xL,D+ cD],a no ﬀer implicitly
deﬁnes a reported cash ﬂow, ˜ x.
The question is now whether there exists a function Q(.) such that the manager has
incentives to play the strategy in (1). It turns out that there exists a unique solution to this
problem, which moreover can be given a closed-form characterization. Quite remarkably,
t h es o l u t i o nd o e sn o td e p e n do nt h ec a s hﬂow distribution f(x). The intuition is that the
investor’s accept/reject strategy serves to control the manager’s reporting behavior, and
the manager knows the realization of x, so the prior distribution of x is irrelevant.
Denote the manager’s utility as a function of the "report" ˜ x [ w i t ha ni m p l i e do ﬀer
min(D, ˜ x − cD)] and the true state x by U(˜ x;x), for simplicity just written U(˜ x).F o r
the manager’s incentive-compatibility constraint to hold, it must be the case that U(˜ x)
is maximized for ˜ x = x. The question is whether there exists a veriﬁcation function Q(.)
such that truth-telling is indeed the optimal strategy.
The manager has no interest in oﬀering the lender a payment that exceeds D,a n d
t h el e n d e r ’ sr i g h tt od e m a n dv e r i ﬁcation is contingent on oﬀers less than D.C o n s i d e r
9A note on equilibrium selection: There can exist sequentially rational equilibria with deterministic
monitoring but these equilibria have the unreasonable feature that an oﬀer slightly less than D are rejected
by the creditor, which would not be optimal play by the creditor given that he assigns suﬃciently high
probability to the cash ﬂow being in the intermediate range (a similar argument can be made against
equilibria where the entrepreneur plays a mixed strategy). Our approach to the contracting problem is
in this respect similar to that in Gale & Hellwig (1989), and can be seen in contrast to e.g., Krasa &
Villamil (2000, 2003), which focus on such pooling equilibria.
8therefore values of ˜ x on the interval [xL,D+cD],a n dl e td := x − ˜ x be the magnitude of
cash ﬂow misreporting. First consider the case x ∈ [xL,D+ cD].W et h e nh a v et h a t ,
U(b x)=Q(˜ x)[cD + d]+[ 1− Q(˜ x)]0 (2)
= Q(˜ x)[cD + d]
In words, since the manager gets nothing if the creditor rejects the concession pledge,
the expected utility of the manager after making a report ˜ x just equals the concession
proposal (cD+d) multiplied by the probability of the creditor accepting the proposal. We







[cD + d] − Q(˜ x)=0 (3)










where K is an integration constant. Using the corner condition Q(D +cD)=1 ,11 we can








cD , ˜ x ∈ [xL,D+ cD]
1,f o r˜ x ∈ [D + cD,x H]
(6)
Note that Q(.) in (6) induces truth-telling for x<D+ cD.12 H e n c ew et h e nh a v et h e
10The equilibrium Q(.) function must be continuous. Were it not for some x, the manager would be
made better oﬀ by setting the announced x slightly higher than the true x (to thereby pay out only
slightly more but have discontinuos jump in accept probability).
11This condition follows from the continuity requirement mentioned in the previous footnote.
12To see that the second order condition for maximum is satisﬁed, diﬀerentiate U(b x) twice with respect




(d − cD) which is clearly negative for d =0 .
9following result.
Proposition 1 (Debt) In equilibrium, the manager oﬀers ˜ D = D if x ≥ D + cD.I f










The true cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm is on the horizontal axis, and the accept probability of
the creditor on the vertical axis. The function Q(x) is the equilibrium accept probability,
given that the oﬀer from the lender is represented by the function ˜ D(x) in (1). The accept
probability Q(.) is inversely related to the extent of the default D − x, which is intuitive
because understating the true cash ﬂow must be costly to induce truth-telling. It implies
that the lender will be less lenient with ﬁrms with large defaults. If we think of the lender
accepting the entrepreneur’s oﬀer as the ﬁrm successfully restructuring its debt out of
court and the lender rejecting the oﬀer as the ﬁrm going to formal bankruptcy (under
e.g., Ch. 11), then the proposition implies that ﬁrms are more likely to enter formal
bankruptcy the larger their default. The intuition for convexity of Q(.) is that it is more
tempting for the manager to underreport the cash ﬂow when x is relatively high, so that
the steepness of Q(.) must be higher for higher reports.
Notice that the borrower, expecting the lender to be lenient with defaults (with positive
probability), for x ∈ [D,D+cD] has an incentive to oﬀer a lower repayment than D even
10though he has suﬃcient cash to avoid default. In other words, we get strategic defaults
in equilibrium for x ∈ [D,D + cD].13
We should emphasize that the perhaps the most plausible interpretation of the mixed
strategy played by the creditor is that the entrepreneur faces a market of possible ﬁ-
nanciers, and where each ﬁnancier may play a pure strategy on when to verify (e.g., to
verify for any default larger than z,w h e r ez is some positive constant), so that the mixed
strategy reﬂects the average behavior played by potential creditors, not the strategy played
by each possible creditor. Under this interpretation, the oﬀer function ˜ D(x) is a best re-
sponse to the average or expected play by creditors, not necessarily the best response to
the particular creditor played (this is a standard interpretation of mixed strategy equilib-
ria in the game-theoretic literature, see e.g., Rubinstein, 1991). The same interpretation
is applicable to the equilibrium we derive under pure equity and under mixed ﬁnancing.
We have assumed that veriﬁcation state payoﬀs can only depend on x. Alternatively,
we could enrich the contractual space by allowing veriﬁcation state payoﬀs to depend
both on x (resources available) as before, and the report ˜ x (this assumes that reports
are contractible). Speciﬁcally, the contract could specify a punishment for the manager if
caught lying (˜ x 6= x), an idea explored by Mookherjee & Png (1989) and Persons (1997).
In Appendix C, we consider such contracts and show that they would yield qualitatively
the same results as the current contracts.
3.2 Pure equity ﬁnancing
We model outside equity as a linear contract that gives the investor a fractional right,
β ∈ (0,1],t ot h eﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. Linearity is consistent with laws protecting minority
shareholders, in that a smaller ownership share should give proportionally the same cash
ﬂow rights (interpreted broadly as dividends, liquidation proceeds, or a takeover premium)
as a larger ownership share.14
13That strategic defaults are empirically important is shown by Esty and Megginson (2003), which in
an empirical analysis of international project ﬁnancing argue that lending syndicates are structured to
deter strategic defaults rather than to improve monitoring incentives of lenders.
14The presence of executive options, which presumably are exercised when the ﬁrm is doing well, would
generate concavity in the outside investors’ payout. This issue is left for future research.
11As with D i nt h ec a s eo fd e b tﬁnancing, β will be determined by the funding require-
ment and the outside investor’s participation constraint, but can be viewed as exogenous
at this point. The cash ﬂo wr i g h ta s s o c i a t e dw i t he q u i t yi ss u p p o r t e db ya nunconditional
right for the outside shareholder to intervene. The combination fractional cash ﬂow right
and unconditional right to intervene is consistent with equity as observed in practice, and
is the same type of approach as e.g., Myers (2000) and Andersen & Nyborg (2001). If
equity is allowed to have a conditional control right, it would make equity more debt-like,
but would yield qualitatively the same type of results. We furthermore assume that the
veriﬁcation cost under outside equity is borne by the investor. This assumption implies
for example that a shareholder cannot be reimbursed for costs of engaging in a proxy
contest. Our results do not depend on this formulation.15
A strategy by the entrepreneur is an oﬀer-function ˜ E(x),w h e r e ˜ E :[ xL,x H] → [0,x H],
and ˜ E ≤ x. A strategy for the equity holder is an accept function P( ˜ E),w h e r eP(.) is
a mapping from the set of possible repayments [0,x H] to a probability on [0,1].A sw i t h
debt, we consider sequentially rational equilibria of the game between the manager and
the equity holder. This means that the shareholders cannot precommit to a monitoring
strategy, see e.g., Admati & Pﬂeiderer (1994) for a similar type of assumption. Given the
cash ﬂow right β, and the assumption that intervention costs are covered by the investor,
the investor receives βx − cE in net payoﬀ if he decides to intervene, where cE is the
intervention cost.
Analogous to the case of pure debt ﬁnancing, we consider signaling equilibria where
the entrepreneur plays a pure strategy. Thus, for a given β and ˜ E the equity holder must
be indiﬀerent on whether to verify, or
˜ E(x)=βx − cE (7)
Since the function ˜ E(x) in (7) is strictly increasing, an oﬀer implicitly deﬁnes a reported
15Letting the ﬁrm absorb the veriﬁcation cost, as in the case of debt ﬁnancing, implies that the share-
holder is oﬀered ˜ E(x)=β(x − cE) in equilibrium, rather than ˜ E(x)=βx − cE. The equilibrium accept
probability, given β, is independent of who bears the intervention cost cE. However, the required own-
ership fraction β in the alternative formulation will be less, since the investor receives β(x − cE) in
equilibrium rather than βx − cE. This gives a higher accept probability P(.) and hence lower expected
veriﬁcation costs, but no other qualitative change in the results.
12cash ﬂow, ˜ x. The question again is whether there exists a function P(˜ x) such that truthful
reporting is indeed obtained in equilibrium. Imposing the corner condition P(xH)=1 ,
this problem conveniently turns out to have a unique solution, which can be given a
closed-form characterization.
Proposition 2 (Outside equity) In equilibrium, the manager oﬀers the investor βx −
cE, and the investor accepts the manager’s oﬀer with probability P(x)=e
−β
xH−x
cE , x ∈
[xL,x H].
Proof. See Appendix A.
The probability of the outside equity holder intervening is decreasing in the size of the
payment that the entrepreneur oﬀers. This is intuitive, the higher the earnings and the
h i g h e rt h ed i v i d e n dp a y o u tt h el e s si st h ec h a n c et h a ts h a r e h o l d e r sw i l lﬁnd it necessary
to intervene. Note also that there is a positive probability of intervention for all x,i n
c o n t r a s tt ow h a tt h ec a s ei sw i t hd e b tﬁnancing.
As can readily be seen, for a given ˜ x, the shareholder’s accept probability P(˜ x) is
decreasing in his ownership stake β. Intuitively, higher outside ownership increases the
potential for the insider to divert cash away from the outsider by under-reporting the
true cash ﬂow, which in turn forces the outsider to intervene with a greater probability
in order to induce truth-telling. The straightforward implication is that a higher outside
ownership implies more active owners, in terms of intervening more frequently.
We may notice that β cannot be arbitrarily small for equity ﬁnancing to work, because
t h e r em u s tb es u ﬃcient incentives for the equity holder to intervene after being oﬀered a
(low) payment.16 As we shall see later, this property of equity implies that small projects
(a low I) will be 100% debt ﬁnanced.
We now turn to the case where the ﬁrm may be both debt and equity ﬁnanced.
16More speciﬁcally, if β <
cE
xL
then the equity holder will not have incentives to monitor when xL
is (truthfully) reported. But then the manager will always report xL and an equilibrium cannot exist.
Hence equity ﬁnancing implies that β ≥
cE
xL
>> 0. If a liquidity reserve can be provided ex-ante, by e.g.,
the outside investors providing more than I, then the minimum β can be decreased, but must still be
bounded away from zero.
134 Capital structure
We now consider the possibility of the entrepreneur issuing both debt and equity to
ﬁnance the project. We take the creditor to be the senior claimant and the outside equity
holder to be the junior claimant, meaning that the entrepreneur settles his accounts with
the creditor before proposing a payout to the outside equity holder. The objective of
the manager is to pick the ﬁnancial structure that minimizes expected veriﬁcation costs,
subject to the constraint that the outside investors are willing to participate.
First, the manager funds the amount I with a fraction α in the form of debt and
(1−α) in the form of equity, where α ∈ [0,1],a n dD and β are agreed upon.17 The cash
ﬂow is then realized and observed only by the manager. Upon observing the true cash
ﬂow, the manager oﬀers a debt repayment ˜ D to the creditor, which the creditor accepts
with probability q( ˜ D). If the creditor rejects the oﬀer, he incurs the cost cD and gets the
net payout min[D,x − cD], while the equity holder gets max[0,β(x − D − cD)].18 The
entrepreneur’s payoﬀ is the residual. If the creditor accepts the manager’s oﬀer ˜ D,t h e
manager proceeds to the shareholder with a repayment oﬀer ˜ E, which the shareholder
accepts with probability p( ˜ E). By conditioning p only on ˜ E, we are implicitly assuming
that the equity holder does not observe ˜ D, only whether the creditor chose to verify or
n o t .T h ec a s ew h e r e ˜ D is observable to the equity holder, so that p is a function of both
˜ E and ˜ D, has qualitatively similar properties, but is algebraically more complex, and is
considered in Appendix D. If the shareholder accepts the oﬀer ˜ E, the manager retains
x − ˜ D − ˜ E. If the shareholder rejects the oﬀer, and veriﬁes, the shareholder receives
β(x − ˜ D) − cE, and the manager gets the residual. We assume that the creditor by
accepting waives any future rights to the cash ﬂow. This is consistent with bankruptcy
law as practiced in e.g., the U.S. where repudiation is limited to situations under which
the creditor can show that he was coerced to accept the ﬁrm’s oﬀer (see Berglöf, Roland,
17The two contracts β and D are assumed to be agreed upon in a manner that excludes opportunistic
behavior by a subset of the three agents at the contracting stage. Stylistically, we can think of the
manager solving for the optimal β and D (that satisﬁes the participation constraints), and then oﬀering
and signing the two contracts simultaneously.
18Reasonably, we assume that contracts between the creditor and the equity holder involving the credi-
tor (equity holder) subcontracting the intervention action to the equity holder (creditor) are prohibitively
costly to enforce.
14and von Thadden (2000) for a discussion).
If a (sequentially rational) equilibrium with a mixed capital structure exists, it must
have a similar structure to the equilibria of pure debt and pure equity, in that the manager
oﬀers repayments that (implicitly) reveals the true cash ﬂow, and where the creditor
and the shareholder play a mixed strategy in certain states. We ﬁrst derive the accept
probability functions q(.) and p(.) of debt and equity, respectively, taking the capital
structure α as given on the interior of (0,1). Then we derive results on the optimal capital
structure.
For the creditor’s indiﬀerence condition to hold, it must as under pure debt ﬁnancing





x − cD for x ∈ [xL,D+ cD]
D,f o rx ∈ [D + cD,x H]
(8)
Given this strategy, consider the equity subgame. Consider ﬁrst the case in which the
manager does not default on his debt obligation (by oﬀering ˜ D = D), in which case the
creditor has no choice but to accept the oﬀer. After D is paid out to the creditor, the
manager proceeds to the shareholder with an oﬀer ˜ E,w h e r e ˜ E ∈ [0,x−D].F o rt h ee q u i t y
holder’s indiﬀerence condition to hold,
˜ E(x)=β(x − D) − cE (9)
Again, this oﬀer implicitly contains a report ˜ x. For truthful reporting to occur in this
subgame, it must be the case that p(˜ x)=P(˜ x), ∀˜ x, i.e., the solution to the equity subgame
is identical to the equilibrium of the pure equity ﬁnancing case, considered in the previous
section. This observation is proved in Appendix A.
Consider now the case where the manager asks for a debt concession by oﬀering ˜ D<D .
Conditional on the creditor accepting the oﬀer ˜ D<D , there remains cD (= x− ˜ D)o ft h e
cash-ﬂow, and the equity holder is oﬀered βcD − cE, which he accepts with probability
p(D + cD): =¯ p.
If the equity holder was expected to never verify after a debt concession (i.e., ¯ p =1 )
then q(.)=Q(.), i.e., the creditor would follow the same monitoring strategy as under pure
debt ﬁnancing (treating D as ﬁxed). However, since the shareholder will have incentives to
15monitor after a concession (i.e., ¯ p<1), the creditor is more lenient under mixed ﬁnancing
than under pure debt ﬁnancing. Hence the main new feature of the accept functions under
a mixture is that, holding D constant, the creditor will be more lenient, because he takes
into account that the shareholder will also monitor.
Formally, the equilibrium has the following structure: if x ≥ D+cD, the entrepreneur
oﬀers D to the creditor and β(x − D) − cE to the shareholder, which the shareholder
accepts with probability p(x)=P(x)=e
−β
xH−x
cE . If on the other hand x<D+ cD,
the entrepreneur oﬀers x − cD to the creditor, which the creditor accepts with probabil-
ity q(x)=eψ(x−D−cD),w h e r eψ :=
(1−β)+¯ pβ
(1−β)cD+¯ pcE. The proofs of these statements are in
Appendix A. Informally, we have
Proposition 3 ( C a p i t a lm i x )I ft h eﬁrm’s external ﬁnance is a mixture of debt and equity,
the creditor serves to discipline the manager in low states, and the equity holder disciplines
the manager in high states. Strategic defaults and priority violations occur in equilibrium.







T h et r u ec a s hﬂow of the ﬁrm is on the horizontal axis, and the accept probabilities on
the vertical axis. The function q(x) is the equilibrium accept probability by the creditor,
given that the oﬀer from the lender is represented by the function ˜ D(x).T h ef u n c t i o np(x)
is the equilibrium accept probability by the shareholder (recall that he is given an oﬀer
16only if the creditor has accepted), given that the oﬀer from the lender is represented by
(12). For x<D+cD, there is a positive probability of the creditor monitoring, while the
probability of the shareholder monitoring (conditional on the creditor not monitoring) is
constant (since the repayments are the same). For x ≥ D+cD, there is a zero probability
of the creditor verifying, and a positive (and decreasing) probability of the shareholder
verifying. Hence, there is a division of labor in equilibrium: the creditor disciplines
the entrepreneur by monitoring in the bad states, and the shareholder disciplines the
entrepreneur in good states.
Strategic defaults occur in equilibrium for x ∈ [D,D + cD], by which the manager
defaults even though the ﬁrm has suﬃc i e n tc a s ho nh a n dt op a yo u tt h ef u l ld e b tv a l u e
D.I nt h er e g i o nx ∈ [xL,D+ cD] the lender will accept payments less than D without
demanding a veriﬁcation (with probability q(x)), and at the same time the repayment to
the shareholder is strictly positive. This leniency on the part of the lender constitutes an
absolute priority violation (AP-violation), since it implies that the equity holder receives
a positive payoﬀ (with probability q(.)) even though the lender is not paid the full value
of his debt contract.
These results are of some practical interest, as strategic defaults and violations of
priority rules are common explanations for why risk premia on corporate debt signiﬁcantly
exceed those implied by Merton (1974). Strategic defaults occur in the present setting
b e c a u s ei ti sc o s t l yf o rt h ec r e d i t o rt oc o l l e c th i sp a y m e n ta ss p e c i ﬁed by the contract. The
presence of this cost puts a suﬃcient wedge between the creditor’s proper payment under
the contract and what the insider is actually willing to oﬀer, thus leading to strategic
defaults for x ∈ [D,D + cD]. As shown by Bergman & Callen (1991) and Mella-Barral
& Perraudin (1997) a similar type of eﬀect can occur in symmetric information models,
where there is some costs for outside investors to invoke bankruptcy. It may be pointed
out, however, that in the present setting, there are AP-violations in the sense that both
inside and outside equity receive positive payments even though debt is not paid in full,
while the literature on AP-violations (including the papers referred to above) focuses on
inside equity. The empirical literature on AP-violations (e.g., Franks & Torous, 1989)
obtains measures of the sum of AP-violations of internal and external junior claimants,
and hence is easier comparable to the present model.
17In a recent contribution, Bebchuck (2002) studies the eﬀects of AP-violations on the
ex-ante risk shifting incentives of borrowers, ﬁn d i n gt h a td e b tt h a tp e r m i t sA P - v i o l a t i o n s
induces stronger risk shifting incentives than debt that does not. The eﬀect identiﬁed
by Bebchuck can be generated in the present setting as well. While AP-violations in his
setup are imposed exogenously by giving the borrower a ﬁxed fraction of the ﬁrm’s assets
in any default state, the AP-violations in the present setting arise endogenously, due to
the frictions created by the veriﬁcation costs. By showing that debt with AP-violations
may induce stronger risk shifting incentives than debt without AP-violations, Bebchuck
(2002) identiﬁes an important ex-ante cost of allowing for AP-violations. It may be noted
though that this insight is generated by comparing a riskless project to that of a risky (less
valuable) project. Although using a riskless project as benchmark provides for a clean
experiment, the eﬀects on ex-ante risk shifting incentives from AP-violations become more
ambigous once the benchmark project is assumed risky as well. In such a case, whether
AP-violations will generate greater or less risk shifting incentives will depend on factors
such as the amount of debt that the ﬁrm issues and the underlying returns generating
distribution.
Relatedly, Longhofer (1997) derives the optimal contract under the traditional CSV-
assumption that the creditor is able to pre-commit to verify. He ﬁnds that AP-violations
unambigously increase the cost of debt by increasing the veriﬁcation region. However,
while in Longhofer (1997) AP-violations are imposed exogenously, in the present setting
they obtain endogeneously. And comparing the present contract to that of the traditional
debt contract of the CSV setting under which the creditor commits to verify whenever debt
is not paid in full, and hence do not allow for AP-violations, reveals that AP-violations
will allow lower funding costs in many cases. In other words, debt without a commitment
to verify, and hence debt that allows AP-violations, will in many cases be less costly than
debt under which the creditor commits to veriﬁy, even under CSV.
If the optimal capital structure is mixed, we must have that βcD ≥ cE.O n t h e l e f t
hand side of this expression is the payoﬀ for the shareholder if he veriﬁes (given a low
cash ﬂow), and on the right hand side is his cost of entering the veriﬁcation state. If
the right hand side exceeds the left hand side it would not pay for the shareholder to
monitor after the manager announces a low cash ﬂow, in which case the manager would
18have incentives to misreport the true cash ﬂow, and an equilibrium with a mixed capital
structure cannot exist. From this observation there follows two necessary conditions for
a mix to occur. First, the equity holder’s stake β in the ﬁrm must be bounded away from
zero (i.e., β ≥
cE
cD
). This is consistent with the idea from Admati et al. (1994) that to
be eﬀective monitors each shareholder must hold a suﬃcient stake in the ﬁrm to cover
private monitoring costs. The second condition for mix to occur is that cE <c D,w h i c h
follows from β ∈ (0,1]. This condition is discussed further in Section 4.3.
4.1 Optimal capital structure
Let us now analyze the optimal capital structure, where we can obtain some insights
although closed-form solutions are not feasible. For a given D and β, the expected veri-
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The ﬁrst two terms is the expected veriﬁcation costs for low cash ﬂows (x ∈ [xL,D+cD]),
and the third term is the expected veriﬁcation cost for high cash ﬂows (x ∈ [D+cD,x H]).
The objective of the entrepreneur is to pick the α that minimizes this expression, subject
to the participation constraints of the investors. Notice that for α =0 , i.e., pure equity
ﬁnancing, the ﬁrst and the second term in (10) drop out, and p(x;.)=P(x;.).F o rα =1 ,
i.e., pure debt ﬁnancing, the second and the third term of (10) drop, and q(x;.)=Q(x;.).
Trivially, when cD = cE =0 , any choice of capital structure will be optimal.
The ﬁrst observation we can make about optimal capital structure follows from the
necessary condition for mix βcD ≥ cE.
Proposition 4 High-NPV ﬁrms will be externally ﬁnanced by debt only.
Proof. For the outside equity holder to have incentives to monitor, he must have an
ownership share that exceeds
cE
cD
. This implies that the (expected) veriﬁcation cost is
discontinuous in the point IE =0 ,w h e r eIE := (1−α)I. On the other hand, the expected
19veriﬁcation cost is continuous in the point ID =0 .T h i si m p l i e st h a tﬁrms with high NPV
(low I)w i l lb e1 0 0 %d e b tﬁnanced.
S of a rw eh a v et a k e nD and β as exogenous. To make further headway we need to
include the outside investors’ participation constraints, and endogenize D and β.F o rt h e




(x − cD)f(x)dx +
Z xH
D+cD
Df(x)dx = αI (11)
Notice that the creditor’s expected utility is a function of D,b u tn o tβ, since debt is the
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[β(x − D) − cE]f(x)dx =( 1− α)I (12)
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To ﬁnd the optimal capital structure, it is more convenient to let D rather than α be
the choice variable of the entrepreneur. The ﬁrst order condition for minimum for the












The ﬁrst and the second partial derivative on the right hand side can be evaluated from
(10), and the third can be evaluated from (13).20
Equipped with these expressions, we have the following.
19It can easily be veriﬁed that the participation constraints must be binding.




=0will hold for the optimal face value of debt, D∗, and hence the optimal
capital structure α∗ implicitly, since α is a function of D from equation (11). In other words, D∗
uniquely determines α∗.
20Proposition 5 The ﬁrm will never be 100% equity ﬁnanced.
Proof. Letting D go to 0 in (14) gives a negative expression, as shown in Appendix
B.
Note that this result does not hinge on debt being risk free, as shown in the proof.
We have established that the ﬁrm will be 100% debt ﬁnanced for a suﬃciently low
funding requirement, and that the ﬁrm will never be 100% equity ﬁnanced (even if the
veriﬁcation cost for equity should be much lower than the veriﬁcation cost for debt). Some
intuition for these results can be captured by a ﬁgure, which compares the expected cost







The ﬁgure shows the cost of capital (veriﬁcation cost) for pure debt ﬁnancing (VD)
and pure equity ﬁnancing (VE), as a function of the funding requirement I.F o r a l o w
funding requirement, pure debt is the better ﬁnancing due to the discontinuity of VE
in the point I =0 , which arises because a β >> 0 is required for the equity holder to
have incentives to monitor ex-post. That gives intuition for Proposition 4. For a higher
funding requirement, VDexceeds VE, and one may think that pure equity dominates
am i x e dﬁnancing. However, having a mix of capital has a lower veriﬁcation cost than
pure equity, because it is on the margin cheaper to issue debt than to issue more equity.
T h i sc a nb ec a p t u r e db yc o m paring the gradient of VDat a low level of debt with the
gradient of VEwith a high level of equity, drawn in the ﬁgure. That gives intuition for
21Proposition 5. What drives the convexity of VDis that the face value of debt D,v i at h e
creditor’s participation constraint, is convex in the amount of funding αI delivered by the
creditor. The reason for this is that default probability of debt is increasing in D,a n d
that this factor becomes more important as αI and thus D is increased.21
Our theory of capital structure is related to the trade-oﬀ theory of capital structure,
where the optimal mix of debt and equity obtains at the point where the tax beneﬁto f
debt, on the margin, equals the expected bankruptcy cost. In our setting, the optimal
mix of debt and (outside) equity obtains when the expected intervention cost associated
with debt, on the margin, equals the expected intervention cost of equity. A distinction
to the trade-oﬀ theory is that the latter does not make a distinction between inside and
outside equity, since equity in this theory serves just as a buﬀer against bankruptcy. In
the present theory, however, outside equity has an active role in disciplining the manager
and there is therefore a clear distinction between inside and outside equity. In the choice
b e t w e e ni n s i d ea n do u t s i d ee q u i t ya saﬁnancing mean, the entrepreneur would choose
inside equity because the veriﬁcation cost is lower. As such, our theory has predictions
reminiscent of pecking-order: inside funds are preferred, then debt, and if the funding
need is large, issue outside equity along with debt.
To make the equilibrium structure more concrete, let us now consider an example.
4.2 A typical example
Recall that the cash ﬂow x follows the density function f(x) with support [xL,x H],t h e





, xL =1 .2, xH =3 .8, cD = 1
2, cE = 1
5, I =1 .4.
Denoting the optimum values by a * topscript, we get that for these parameter values,
D∗ = .80, β
∗ = .47, α∗ = .57,a n dV ∗ = .17,w h e r eD∗ is the optimum face value of debt,
β
∗ is the optimum ownership share of the outside equity holder, α∗ is the fraction of I
21Although the convexity of VDholds for all the examples we have considered, we do not have a general
p r o o fo fi t .
22ﬁnanced by debt, and V ∗ is the expected veriﬁcation cost.22 Hence we get a mixed capital
structure, where 57% of the capital is raised through issuing debt. By deﬁning the debt
ratio of the ﬁrm as the (expected) value of debt, αI, divided by the value of the ﬁrm,
Ex− V , i.e., g :=
αI
Ex− V
,w eg e tt h a tg∗ = .34.
Interpreting cD as a bankruptcy cost, cD = 1
2 gives a bankruptcy cost of 21% of
the ﬁrm’s market value Ex−V ∗ =2 .33. This magnitude is consistent with the empirical
evidence on bankruptcy costs of 10−20% of the ﬁrm’s market value, as found by Andrade
and Kaplan (1998), and the 25% found by Altman (1985).
To get an idea of how the optimal capital structure changes as a function of the exoge-
nous variables, let us perform three comparative statics exercises; increasing the funding
requirement, decreasing the veriﬁcation cost for equity, and changing risk by changing
the support of the distribution. The example is typical in that changing parameter and
distribution assumptions, we were unable to generate examples that did not have identical
(qualitative) comparative statics features.
By increasing the funding requirement to I =1 .5 in Example 1, and keeping the
other parameters unchanged, we get D∗ = .76, β
∗ = .54, α∗ = .51,a n dg∗ = .33. Hence
increasing the funding requirement leads to a lower debt ratio, which is as expected given
Proposition 4. Decreasing the veriﬁcation cost, by setting cE equal to e.g., .15 in Example
1, we get D∗ = .75, β
∗ = .46, α∗ = .54,a n dg∗ = .23, hence also a decrease in the debt
ratio.
We can also decrease risk in Example 1, by setting xL =1 .3 and xH =3 .7.I n t h a t
case, we obtain D∗ = .94, β
∗ = .42, α∗ = .67,a n dg∗ = .40. Hence, when decreasing
risk, we get that 67% of the capital is raised through issuing debt, in contrast to 57%
before, and the ﬁrm’s debt ratio increases from 34% to 40%. This result is consistent with
empirical evidence of less risky ﬁrms having a higher debt ratio than more risky ﬁrms (see
the survey by Harris & Raviv, 1991, and for more recent evidence, Fama and French,
2002). We can sum up these ﬁndings in a remark.
Remark 1 The following gives a lower debt ratio,
i)Increasing the funding requirement




To obtain a mixed capital structure, we need that cE <c D. Although we are not aware of
systematical empirical work comparing the intervention cost of debt and the intervention
cost of equity, this condition is consistent with the following two lines of thought.
First, if intervention by creditors involves liquidation of the ﬁrm, while intervention by
the equity holder involves continued operation of the ﬁrm, we can interpret the condition
cE <c D as saying that the social cost of intervention by the creditor (cost of taking control
plus reduced value due to liquidation) is higher than the social cost of intervention by the
equity holder (cost of taking control). Observe that the creditor is always reimbursed the
cD in the veriﬁcation state, and hence we are free to interpret cD as a social cost rather
than the private cost incurred by the creditor.
The second justiﬁcation for cE <c D is as follows. In an extended model, we can imag-
ine the veriﬁcation costs as being determined by ex-ante investments by the claimants.
The idea is that if the investors can make investments in monitoring technology before x
is realized, then creditors will have less incentives than equity holders to invest, and we
get cE <c D as part of the equilibrium description. Let us illustrate this idea. Under a















f(x)dx < 1 (16)
Hence the marginal gain from decreasing veriﬁcation cost equals the probability p of the
entrepreneur making a debt concession pledge, i.e., whenever x ∈ [xL,D+ cD].




(βx − cE)f(x)dx (17)





Hence the equityholder gains from decreasing cE independently of the realization of x.
A comparison of the derivatives (16) and (18) reveals that the marginal gain from
improving monitoring technology is higher for an equity holder than for a creditor.
Suppose that the creditor and the investor have access to an identical technology for
making the monitoring less costly. Such investments can take place after the contracts
{D,β} are signed, but before the entrepreneur makes his repayment oﬀer. Then, in
equilibrium, the equity holder will make a higher investment in monitoring technology
than a creditor, thus leading to cE <c D in equilibrium. Of course, the magnitude
of cD − cE will depend on the speciﬁc cost function associated with improvements in
monitoring technology, but the main message is clear: there are good economic reasons to
believe that cE <c D in equilibrium that is entirely due to the diﬀerent payoﬀ structure
for a debt and for an equity claim.23
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have constructed a theory of capital structure that accommodates strategic defaults
and priority violations, phenomena that are well-known from the empirical and theoret-
ical literature, but has not been integrated into a theory of capital structure before. In
addition, the model produces implications that are consistent with several other stylized
23Under a mixed ﬁnancing, the incentives for making investments in monitoring will be the same for the
creditor as under pure debt ﬁnancing, while the incentives for the equity holder will be reduced because the
creditor may not accept the repayment oﬀer from the entrepreneur (and there is consequently a positive
probability that the investment in cE will be wasted). However, the simple message from comparing (16)
and (18) will still be present, interacting with other eﬀects. We leave a further exploration of this issue
for further work.
25facts, such as bankruptcies occurring in equilibrium, a division of labor in disciplining the
entrepreneur between diﬀerent security holders, and the debt ratio of the ﬁrm increasing
in its NPV. Also, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with low funding requirements will issue only debt,
while ﬁrms with suﬃcently high funding requirements will issue a mix of debt and equity.
In other words, ﬁrms may be all debt ﬁnanced, but will never be all equity ﬁnanced, even
if the intervention cost of equity is much lower than that of debt.
The basis of the theory is the cash diversion problem. Under the simplest interpre-
tation this says that the manager steals the money. Although this phenomenon may be
important in undeveloped economies (Shleifer & Vishnu 1997 provide some examples),
the cash diversion in the model may more reasonably be seen as a short form of a situ-
ation where the manager may divert the cash into unproﬁtable pet projects if given the
opportunity, which creates a need for investors to discipline. In contrast to some earlier
models of costly state veriﬁcation, our added features are to require sequential rationality
and to allow for equity contracts in addition to debt.
For future work, we see a range of possible extensions of the present framework. First,
it may be of interest to introduce dynamics in the model, to discuss such issues as divi-
dend policy and delays in debt repayments. A second extension of our work would be to
discuss commitment debt (where the creditors commit to verifying whenever the proposed
repayment falls short of some treshold) vis-a-vis non-commitment debt (considered in the
paper) and to allow for diﬀerent seniority in debt claims. Dispersed investors in the secu-
rities market may have commitment through their free-rider status, while banks do not.
A preliminary result from our analysis of this question indicates that non-commitment
(bank) debt dominates commitment (security) debt for projects with a cash ﬂow distrib-
ution which is skewed to the left, which is intuitively appealing, as the non-commitment
debt would rely on verifying less often in low cash-ﬂow states. Third, it would be of
interest to extend the current setup to accommodate investments in monitoring tech-
nology. Equity holders may have stronger incentives than debt holders to invest in a
monitoring technology, but on the other hand it is not obvious how the private costs of
investment levels correspond to the social costs. If claimants may have private costs that
diﬀer from social costs when investing in monitoring technology this may have interesting
implications for security design that lies outside the scope of the present paper.
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7A p p e n d i x A
Here we prove Proposition 2, and then prove Proposition 3.
7.1 Proof of Proposition 2
F o rt h em a n a g e rt op r e f e ra n n o u n c i n gt r u t h f u l l y ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t ,
U(˜ x)=P(˜ x)[x − β˜ x + cE]+[ 1− P(˜ x)](1 − β)x (A1)
is maximized for truthful reporting, i.e., ˜ x = x.D i ﬀerentiating (A1) with respect to ˜ x









By using the corner condition P(xH)=1 , we obtain that the probability of the shareholder
accepting the announcement ˜ x (with an implied oﬀer β˜ x − cE to the investor) equals,
P(˜ x)=e
−
β(xH − ˜ x)
cE , x, ˜ x ∈ [xL,x H] (A4)





















d − 1] < 0 for d =0 .
7.2 Proof of Proposition 3





x − cD for x ∈ [xL,D+ cD]
D,f o rx ∈ [D + cD,x H]
(A5)
There are two cases of interest, ˜ D = D and ˜ D<D .W h e n˜ D = D, the true cash-ﬂow




β(xH − ˜ x)
cE (A6)
T h er e a s o nf o rt h i si st h ef o l l o w i n g .N o t et h a ta f t e rD is repaid,
U(˜ x)=p(˜ x)[x − D − β(˜ x − D)+cE]+( 1− p(˜ x))[(1 − β)(x − D)] (A7)
=( 1 − β)(x − D)+p(˜ x)[cE − β(˜ x − x)]
30Diﬀerentiating with respect to ˜ x and substituting for ˜ x = x, one obtains the ﬁrst order







Using the corner condition p(xH)=1and solving the diﬀerential equation, we obtain the
p(˜ x) function from (A6). As for pure debt and pure equity ﬁnancing, it can easily be seen
that the second order conditions for maximum hold.
Now consider the case ˜ D<D , which must occur when x<D+ cD.T h e r e a r e
then two cases, the creditor accepting the oﬀer and the creditor rejecting the oﬀer. If
the creditor rejects the oﬀer, both the manager and the shareholder receive zero. If the
creditor accepts the oﬀer, there remains cD of the cash ﬂow, and for the equity holder to
be indiﬀerent between accepting and not accepting, the manager must oﬀer him βcD−cE
which, by continuity of p(.) is accepted with probability p(D + cD). The utility of the
m a n a g e ri nt h i sc a s ei s
U(x)=q(x)[(1 − β)cD +¯ pcE] (A9)
Suppose now that the manager reports ˜ x<x , with the implied oﬀer to the creditor of
˜ x − cD,w h e r ed = x− ˜ x. If accepted, the manager is now left with cD + d and oﬀers the
shareholder an amount βcD−cE (where d is suﬃciently large to ensure cD+d ≥ βcD−cE
or d ≥ (1 − β)cD + cE), which the shareholder accepts with probability ¯ p. The utility of
the manager from such misreporting becomes,
U(˜ x)=q(˜ x)[(1 − β)cD +¯ p(cE + d)+( 1− ¯ p)(1 − β)d] (A10)
= q(˜ x)[(1 − β)cD +¯ pcE +[ ( 1− β)+¯ pβ]d]






[(1 − β)cD +¯ pcE]+q(x)[(1 − β)+¯ pβ]=0 (A11)
31Solving then for
dU(x)





(1−β)cD+¯ pcE, as stated in the text.
8A p p e n d i x B
As described in the main text, we can write the expected veriﬁcation as purely a function
of D, by combining equation (10) and equation (13). Diﬀerentiating V with respect to D
in equation (10) we then get,
dV
dD
























∂D, we obtain the following











































and the second order condition for minimum is
d2V
dD2 > 0. Equation (B2) and (B3) deﬁne
D∗ implicitly, and hence the optimal capital structure α∗ implicitly, since α is a function
of D from equation (11).
The p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5proceeds as follows. To avoid the triviality of debt being
32r i s k - f r e e( i nw h i c hc a s ei ti so b v i o u st h a tt h eﬁrm would issue some debt), assume that





















9 Appendix C: alternative contracts
Here we consider the possibility that veriﬁcation state payoﬀs can be made conditional
on both the true cash ﬂow, x, and the announced cash ﬂow ˜ x.S p e c i ﬁcally, to obtain
truth-telling in the cheapest possible way, for any x, we consider the maximum penalty
for false reports, which is to punish such that U(x, ˜ x)=0whenever ˜ x 6= x.
9.1 Debt contracts





x − min(D,x), ˜ x = x
0,f o r˜ x<x
(C1)
where ˜ x is the reported x.N o t i c et h a tt h i sc o n t r a c tm a yi m p l yap a y o u tt ot h ec r e d i t o r
higher than D (in the case where x is suﬃciently high, and ˜ x 6= x).24 We ﬁrst consider the
incentives for truth-telling for x ∈ [xL,D+ cD]. The utility from truth-telling becomes
simply,
U(x)=Q(x)cD (C2)
24If the payout to the creditor is limited to D also when a lie is detected, it can easily be shown that
the equilibrium accept function is identical to in the original problem.
33The utility from announcing ˜ x,w h e r e˜ x<x ,
U(˜ x)=Q(˜ x)(x − ˜ x + cD)+( 1− Q(˜ x))0. (C3)
To obtain truthful reporting,
U(x) − U(˜ x)=Q(x)cD − Q(˜ x)(x − ˜ x + cD) ≥ 0, ˜ x ≤ x, x ∈ [xL,D+ cD] (C4)
This is the same expression as in the original setup, and hence we obtain that for truth-
telling to occur for x on the interval [xL,D+cD] we get the same solution as in the original
setup. We now consider the incentives for truth-telling when x ∈ [D+cD,x H],a n dw h e r e
the announcement lies below this interval.
The utility from truth-telling becomes,
U(x)=x − D.( C 5 )
The utility from announcing ˜ x,w h e r e˜ x<D+ cD,
U(˜ x)=Q(˜ x)(x − ˜ x + cD)+( 1− Q(˜ x))0.( C 6 )
To obtain truthful reporting,
U(x) − U(˜ x)=x − D − Q(˜ x)(x − ˜ x + cD) ≥ 0, ˜ x<D+ cD <x (C7)
Solving for Q(˜ x) we obtain,
Q(˜ x) ≤
x − D
x − ˜ x + cD
, ˜ x<D+ cD <x (C8)
For every x,t h i se q u a t i o nd e ﬁnes the set of accept probabilities consistent with truth-
telling. The maximum accept probability (which is the relevant to ensure truth-telling in
the cheapest possible way) for each x is hence deﬁned as,
x − D
x − ˜ x + cD
, ˜ x<D+ cD <x (C9)
34As can easily be veriﬁed, this function is minimized for x = xH (for every ˜ x).25 Hence,
for truth-telling to occur in the cheapest possible way,
Q(˜ x)=
x − D
x − ˜ x + cD
, ˜ x<D+ cD <x (C10)







xH−x+cD, x ≤ D + cD
1,f o rx>D+ cD
(C11)
This function is continuous, increasing, and convex, and takes on the value 1 for x =
D + cD. In other words it has the same qualitative properties as the Q(.),f u n c t i o n
d e r i v e di nt h em a i nt e x t .
9.2 Equity contracts
We consider contracts that are linear in x conditional on truth-telling, but yields U(x)=0





(1 − β)x, ˜ x = x
0,f o r˜ x<x
(C12)
We now derive the accept probability in this case. The utility from truth-telling becomes,
U(x)=P(x)[x − βx + cE]+[ 1− P(x)][x − βx]=( 1− β)x + P(x)cE.( C 1 3 )
The utility from announcing ˜ x,w h e r e˜ x<x ,
U(˜ x)=P(˜ x)(x − β˜ x + cE)+( 1− P(˜ x))0 = P(˜ x)(x − β˜ x + cE).( C 1 4 )
For announcing truthfully to be incentive compatible, it must be the case that,
U(x) − U(˜ x)=( 1− β)x + P(x)cE − P(˜ x)(x − β˜ x + cE) ≥ 0, ˜ x<x .( C 1 5 )
25Formally, xH−D
xH−k+cD < x−D
x−k+cD, k<D+ cD <x ,x H.
35Rearranging,
P(x) ≥
P(˜ x)(x − β˜ x + cE) − (1 − β)x
cE
.( C 1 6 )
For every x,t h i se q u a t i o nd e ﬁnes the set of accept probabilities consistent with truth-
telling. Suppose that truth-telling is hardest to obtain for x = xH (i.e., has the lowest
maximum value of P(˜ x) consistent with truth-telling). Then, imposing the corner condi-
tion P(xH)=1yields,
P(˜ x) ≤
(1 − β)xH + cE
xH − β˜ x + cE
(C17)
Hence, for truth-telling to occur in the cheapest possible way,
P(˜ x)=
(1 − β)xH + cE
xH − β˜ x + cE
(C18)
In that case, we get an equilibrium accept probability function which equals,
P(x)=
(1 − β)xH + cE
xH − βx + cE
, x ∈ [xL,x H] (C19)
Notice that this function is increasing and convex, and takes on the value 1 for x = xH.
In other words it has the same qualitative properties as the P(.) function derived in the
main text.26
The question is now under which conditions the P(.) function deﬁn e di n( C 1 9 )e n s u r e s
truth-telling for all x (or in other words when truth-telling is hardest to obtain for x =
xH). In that case P(.) in (C19) is a solution to the problem. We have the following
result.27
Proposition 6 For suﬃciently small cE,t h eP(.) function given by (C19) ensures truth-
telling in equilibrium for all x.
26Not surprisingly, the P(.) function deﬁned here induces a lower veriﬁcation cost than the P(.) function
derived in the main text. However, we have not taken into account that making announcements veriﬁable
to courts may have some cost.
27The problem with generalizing this result to hold for all cE is that for suﬃciently high cE the function
deﬁned by (C19) will not induce truth-telling for all values of x. In particular, there will exist x< <x H
such that lying yields a higher payoﬀ then truth-telling. We conjecture that a P(.) function can be deﬁned
such that there always exists (truth-telling) equilibria, but this is a rather complex variational calculus
problem that lies beyond the reach of the present paper.
36Proof. We need to show that for suﬃciently small (but positive) cE,t h eP(.) function
deﬁned by (C19) ensures truth-telling for all x. Letting cE go to zero in (C15), we obtain
that to ensure truth-telling,
(1 − β)x − P(˜ x)(x − β˜ x) ≥ 0 (C20)
substituting in for P(.) implies that,
(1 − β)x −
(1 − β)xH
xH − β˜ x
(x − β˜ x) (C21)
= x −
(x − β˜ x)xH
xH − β˜ x
= β˜ x
xH − x
xH − β˜ x
> 0;∀x<x H, ˜ x<x
By the continuity of
xH − x
xH − β˜ x
, there exists a strictly positive constant ε,s u c ht h a t
xH − x
xH − β˜ x
> 0 for cE ∈ [0,ε].
We can notice that the (expected) veriﬁcation cost functions for both types of ﬁnancing
in this case is convex, so not surprisingly it can be shown that a mixed capital structure
can indeed be optimal also in this modiﬁed setup.
10 Appendix D: ˜ D is observable to equity holders
In the main text, we assumed that ˜ D was unobservable to equity holders. In this appendix,
we consider the case where ˜ D is observable to the equity holders, so that the investor’s
accept probability function becomes a function of both ˜ E and ˜ D.





x − cD for x ∈ [xL,D+ cD]
D,f o rx ∈ [D + cD,x H]
(D1)
There are two cases of interest, ˜ D = D and ˜ D<D .W h e n˜ D = D, the true cash-ﬂow




β(xH − ˜ x)
cE (D2)
The second case occurs when ˜ D<D , in which case there remains cD of the cash-ﬂow
after the creditor is paid, which is known to the outside equity holder. Since the veriﬁca-
tion payoﬀ to the equity holder equals βcD − cE with certainty, the manager can ensure
acceptance with probability 1 by oﬀering ˜ E = βcD −cE +ε,w h e r eε is positive but small.
Hence in the equity subgame that follows an accepted oﬀer of ˜ D<Dto the creditor,
the manager oﬀers βcD − cE (or arbitrarily close) and the equity holder accepts with
probability 1.
Let us ﬁnd the q(.) function that induces truth-telling given x, ˜ x ∈ [xL,D+ cD).I f
the manager announces ˜ x, the surplus of the manager will be,
U(˜ x)=q(˜ x)[cD(1 − β)+cE + d] (D3)





[cD(1 − β)+cE]=0 (D4)
which yields the solution,
Ke
x
cD(1 − β)+cE (D5)
We must now determine the integration constant K. To induce truth-telling, the payoﬀ
from truth-telling must be continuous in the point x = D+cD (if not, the manager would
have incentives to under- or overreport),
lim




x→(D+cD)_{q(x)[cD(1 − β)+cE]} = lim
x→(D+cD)+{p(x)+( x − D)(1 − β)}
As argued above, limx→(D+cD)+{p(x)} = p(D+cD).D e n o t elimx→(D+cD)_{q(x)} by q(D+
38cD)−. We then substitute into (D6) to obtain,
q(D + cD)
−[cD(1 − β)+cE]=p(D + cD)cE + cD(1 − β) (D7)
Substituting in for q(D + cD)− and p(D + cD), we can then determine K,
Ke
D + cD
cD(1 − β)+cE [cD(1 − β)+cE]=e
−
β(xH − D − cD)





cD(1 − β)+cE e
−
β(xH − D − cD)
cE cE +( 1− β)cD
cD(1 − β)+cE
Notice that this implies that q(D +cD)− < 1 6= q(D +cD)=1 , in other words the accept
function of the creditor is discontinuous in the point x = D+cD, i.e., a small default will
imply a discontinuous jump (down) in accept probability from 1. The equilibrium then








For a low x, there is a positive probability of the creditor monitoring, while the prob-
ability of the investor monitoring (conditional on the creditor not monitoring) is zero.
For a higher x, there is a zero probability of the creditor verifying, and a positive (and
decreasing) probability of the investor verifying. Hence the monitoring responsibility is
completely specialized in equilibrium; the creditor has the role of disciplining the entre-
39preneur in bad states, and the outside investor has the role of disciplining the manager in
good states. We can notice that the probability of the creditor verifying is discontinuous
in the point x = D + cD, as in the original setup of Townsend (1979) but now without
any assumed commitment power by the creditor.28
Priority violations occur in equilibrium, since in the region x ∈ [xL,D+cD] the lender
will accept payments less than D without demanding a veriﬁcation (with probability q(x)),
and at the same time the repayment to the investor is strictly positive. In fact, since it is
known that only cD remains after the creditor is paid out, the equity holder will accept
any oﬀer higher than βcD − cE with probability 1. As before, strategic defaults occur
in equilibrium for x ∈ [D,D + cD], by which the manager defaults even though the ﬁrm
has suﬃcient cash on hand to pay out the full debt value D. An example with exactly
the same qualitative properties as Example 1 can easily be constructed and is skipped for
brevity.
28A somewhat puzzling implication is that the "total" intervention probability decreases in the point
D + cD. The intuition for this goes as follows. First note that the manager is essentially the residual
claimant in the ﬁnancing game, after the veriﬁcation costs have been paid. He is therefore less anxious
about equity intervening than debt intervening, because cE is lower than cD. Hence to obtain truth-
telling around the point D +cD we need the equity holder to be more lenient with the manager, so that
the intervention probability must drop in the point D + cD.
40